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ABSTRACT 
Research on credit risk and its relationship with capital in a company is important. This is 
because the information about such thing can be considered very beneficial. This study exam-
ines the relationship between risk and capital in Indonesia Banking Market. It tested whether 
bank credit risk taking is correlated with its capital position. In this study, risk and capital 
were based on accounting ratios. Data for the study were taken from Banks cope database 
for the period 2003 to 2008. A two-stage-Regression analysis was used to estimate the rela-
tionship. On the risk taking model, it is correlated with ex post risk, portion of loan loss pro-
vision to capital (RISKCAP), and ratio of net loans to asset (NLTA), and negatively to size 
and inefficiency. On the capital equation, there is negative relationship with risk taking but 
not with inefficiency. Asset size has negative impact on capital positions and profitable banks 
hold more capital. It is clear that risk taking is not influenced by capital and capital is nega-
tively determined by risk taking. In short, the relationship between risk taking and capital is 
not two-way but one way.  
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PENGAMBILAN RISIKO KREDIT DAN POSISI MODAL: 
SEBUAH TEMUAN DARI TWO-STAGE REGRESSION 
ABSTRAK 
Penelitian tentang risiko kredit dan hubungannya dengan modal dalam perusahaan meru-
pakan kajian penting. Ini dikarenakan bahwa informasi tentang hal tersebut sangat berman-
faat. Penelitian ini menguji hubungan antara risiko dan modal di pasar perbankan Indone-
sia. Ini menguji apakah pengambilan risiko kredit bank berkorelasi dengan posisi modalnya. 
Dalam hal ini, risiko dan modal didasarkan pada rasio akuntansi. Datanya diambil dari da-
tabase Bank cope periode 2003 - 2008. Dengan two-stage regression, hubungan tersebut 
dianalisis. Pada model pengambilan keputusan, ternyata berhubungan dengan risiko ex post, 
portion of loan loss provision pada modal (RISKCAP), dan rasio net loan to asset (NLTA), 
dan berkorelasi secara negatif dengan ukuran dan efisiensi. Pada capital equation berkore-
lasi negatif dengan risiko tetapi tidak dengan efisiensi. Ukuran aset berkorelasi secara nega-
tif pada posisi modal dan bank-bank yang bermodal lebih besar. Jadi, jelas bahwa pengam-
bilan risiko tidak dipengaruhi oleh modal dan modal itu sendiri ditentukan secara negatif 
oleh pengambilan risiko. Dengan kata lain, hubungan antara pengambilan risiko dan modal 
bukan dua arah melainkan satu arah.  
 
Kata Kunci: ex-anti-risk, modal, ukuran, inefisiensi. 
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INTRODUCTION 
So far, the role of capital in the financial 
institution has attracted a quite substantial 
attention especially among regulators. In 
fact, the regulator’s attention is mainly to 
prevent from the failure. This is the back-
ground of the enforcement of minimum 
capital requirements on the banks. Quite 
substantial number of bank failure in the end 
of 1980s has regained the authority aware-
ness on the importance of capital. Besides 
that, the widespread of establishment deposit 
insurance scheme has changed the behavior 
of banking firm.  
For that reason, excessive risk-taking 
might otherwise have been encouraged by 
the principle of limited liability and by the 
availability of deposit insurance. Strength-
ened capital regulation has resulted in im-
proved capital ratios for banks, and a more 
stable financial system. However, the 
changes to the regulatory system have been 
criticized on the grounds that an increased 
regulatory capital standard may encourage 
an increase in leverage and portfolio risk. 
Both the theoretical literature and the em-
pirical literature on the impact of capital 
regulation have produced heterogeneous 
results concerning the capital and risk ad-
justment behavior of banks. 
Such a situation is related to agency 
problem theory. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), agency relationship is an 
agreement between two parties. One of them 
(agent) performs certain services on the be-
half of other (principal). Jensen and Meck-
ling started their model with identification of 
two types of interest conflicts that can be 
possible: conflict between manager and 
shareholders, conflict between debt holder 
and shareholders. Under capital regulation, 
the conflict exists between bank managers 
and regulators. 
To test the agency problem related to 
capital regulation, many studies have been 
done. Using set of a cross-section time-
series data on US commercial banks, Ashraf 
(2010) studied the effect of changes in port-
folio risk on the capital adjustment and of 
risk-based capital regulation on portfolio 
risk adjustment. A Simultaneous equation 
model, originally developed by Shrieves and 
Dahl (1992), is used. This methodology is 
superior because it is allowing for simulta-
neous adjustment and interactions between 
portfolio risk and capital. The empirical re-
sults are broadly consistent with the results 
reported in the previous literature especially 
related to the capital buffer theory, which 
suggests that banks increase their capital 
holdings in response to an increase in portfo-
lio risk, in order to avoid regulatory penal-
ties. Empirical evidence support the hy-
potheses that commercial banks to adjust 
their capital and portfolio risk simultane-
ously. Furthermore, there is strong evidence 
that banks increase their loan portfolio con-
centration in order to increase their regula-
tory capital ratios, suggesting that improve-
ments in banks’ capital ratios are achieved at 
the expense of their ability to diversify their 
loans portfolios.  
Banking is the most regulated industry 
in the world. Apart from the product and its 
service, banking regulation also cover its 
institution. The aim of the bank regulation is 
to increase prudential practices that will re-
duce the level of risk bank are exposed to. 
The most important part of banking regula-
tion is regulation on capital. According to 
Mehta and Fung (2004), capital regulation 
has rooted since 1930. USA is a pioneer in 
such regulation when they proposed a pro-
posal in 1986 that require US bank to main-
tain capita that reflect the riskiness of bank 
asset. After the establishment of Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS), in July 1988, Central bank gover-
nors endorse BCBS's document "Interna-
tional Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards", or "Basel Capital 
Accord", to be implemented by the end of 
1992.  
The aim of regulation is to prevent 
banks from excessive risk-taking that make 
banks prone to crisis. Finally, regulators 
tried to link the required capital to the risk of 
the loan portfolio. By 1988, the time of the 
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first international initiative (Basel Accord), 
most countries had already introduced one or 
another form of risk-sensitive capital regula-
tion. The Basel Accord was signed by the 
G10 countries and was intended to apply 
only to internationally active banks. The ac-
cord assigns assets to different risk buckets. 
The assets in a bucket have to be backed by 
a bucket-specific capital requirement and the 
total minimum requirement is set at 8% of 
capital to risk-weighted assets. (BIS Web) 
As capital availability is relatively con-
stant, and becoming a constraint to engage 
on expansion other risky business. It makes 
banks are forced to manage the risk effi-
ciency to prevent from putting more capital. 
The so-called risk management process is 
aimed to the purpose of allocating capital 
efficiently in order to obtain optimal benefits 
and reduce cost of capital. The method used 
was the Bank earning assets as well choose 
the activities that banks may be effectively 
measured in terms of risk and risk adjusted 
return of company culture, the ability of 
capital, organization and infrastructure. It is 
important for banks to understand business 
issues and investment in which the Bank to 
invest so that the Bank may benefit optimum 
amount of capital, risk and return. 
This study attempts to assess the rela-
tionship between credit risk-taking and capi-
tal position in Indonesia banking. This kind 
of study using Indonesia banks is, as far it is 
concerned, is not yet available. Ahmad et al. 
(2007) discusses the determinant of capital 
ratio in Asian banking as a one way process. 
Jeitschko and Shin (2007) on the other hand, 
study on the relationship between portfolio 
risk and capitalization in Korean banking. In 
addition, Konishi and Yasuda (2004) ana-
lyze the factors determining the risk taking 
behavior among Japanese commercial bank. 
This study is an effort to fill the gap in em-
pirical study on this area in Indonesia set-
ting. This study will provide empirical evi-
dence how Indonesia banking industry be-
haved amidst the effort of regulator to re-
duce risk by increasing capital in one side 
and to the risk taking behaviors related to the 
capital regulation on the other side.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESIS 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that 
capital structure is irrelevant or does not af-
fect the value of the company. However, 
when looking at the bank capital structure, 
the story is totally different. Since twenty 
years ago, many studies focused on the rela-
tionship between risk and capital especially 
after the introduction of minimum capital 
regulation. Capital regulation is one of the 
key instruments of modern banking regula-
tion. It is a fact that theoretical foundation 
on the relationship between capital and risk 
mainly based on the theory of moral hazard 
that existed because of agency problem. 
They tested whether increased capital regu-
lation forces bank to increase their risks or 
vice versa (Jokipii and Milne, 2009). 
Shrieves and Dahl (1992) argue that positive 
relationship between risk and capital. 
Jacques and Nigro (1997) on other hand, 
find a negative relationship between change 
in capital regulation and risk level.  
Calem and Rob (1999) quantified the ef-
fect of capital based regulation and found 
the U-shaped relationship between capital 
and risk taking. Konishi and Yasuda (2004) 
analyzed the factors determining the risk-
taking behaviour among Japanese commer-
cial banks and found that risk-taking activi-
ties are reduced when capital regulation is 
introduced. Iannota et al. (2006) compared 
the performance and risk of 181 large banks 
from 15 European countries over the 1999 – 
2004 related to the ownership type. They 
found that ownership type and ownership 
concentration play an important role on risk 
and performance.  
Altunbas, et al. (2007) investigated the 
relationship between capital, risk and effi-
ciency for a large sample of European banks 
between 1992 and 2000. They did not find 
any strong relationship between capital and 
bank risk-taking. Brewer et al. (2009) stud-
ied the determinant of capital ratios across 
12 countries in Europe, USA, and Japan. 
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The study found that banks maintain their 
higher capital ratio when the banking sector 
is relatively smaller and when regulator 
practice prompt corrective action more ac-
tively. Kazion (2009) studied the role of 
capital and find evidences that banks do not 
hold the minimum capital but have voluntary 
capital buffer. Lindquist (2004) studied the 
excess capital both for commercial and sav-
ing bank and finds that saving banks hold 
more capital  
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Based on the theoretical framework, the re-
searcher underlines that relationship between 
capital and risk is made simultaneously and 
is interrelated. This situation is called as en-
dogenity. Since the relationship between 
capital and risk is an over-identified simul-
taneous system, this study uses the OLS to 
run the estimation; it may have simultaneous 
bias and inconsistent problem in the esti-
mated results. Capital equation is over-
identified, it means the reduced-form 
method cannot be used to get the exact esti-
mation indirectly, because there will be 
more than one solution to obtain the original 
postulated parameters (α) from the estimated 
coefficients of reduced-form equations.  
The implication is that the modeling re-
quires the use of a simultaneous equation 
specification and estimation methodology. 
To simplify, the researcher follows the ap-
proach adopted by Altunbas et al. (2007), 
using level data. This approach solves the 
availability of the data. To make possible for 
simultaneous estimation between bank risk, 
bank capital and bank operating efficiency, a 
system equation is used and estimated using 
a two-stage least square (2SLS) approach 
using panel data technique as follows: 
Risk (LTA) = α0 + α1 ETA + α2 RISKCAP + 
α3 Size + α4 NLTA + α5 CIR + α6 RISK + ε 
 (1) 
CAPITAL (ETA) = α0 + α1 LTA + α2 RISK + 
α3 LDR + α4 CIR + α5 ROA + α6 Size + ε 
 (2) 
To estimate the equation (1 and 2), we 
use a statistical Package programmed. Sev-
eral studies have focused on understanding 
the relationship between risk and capital. 
They tested whether an increase in capital 
regulation forces bank to increase their risk 
or vise versa (Jokipii and Alistair & Milne, 
2009). Shrieves and Dahl (1992) argue that 
positive relationship between capital and 
risk is in line to several hypotheses which 
include the unintended effect of minimum 
capital regulation, regulatory cost; bank-
ruptcy cost avoidance as well as managerial 
risk aversion. Jacques and Nigro (1997) on 
other hand find a negative relationship be-
tween change in capital regulation and risk 
level.  
Deelchand and Padgett (2009) con-
firmed that risk, capital, and efficiency are 
determined simultaneously. Using Japanese 
cooperative banks, empirical model shows a 
negative relationship between risk and level 
of capital. Inefficient cooperative banks op-
erate higher risk but also hold more capital. 
The situation may reflect the existence of 
moral hazards problem. In this study, basi-
cally we adopt approach taken by Deelchand 
and Padget (2009) and Heid et al. (2003) 
treated risk, capital, and efficiency simulta-
neously. However, their approach is not 
fully adopted as their efficiency measure is 
specified using stochastic frontier approach 
(SFA). We use accounting ratio to measure 
efficiency i.e., cost to income ratio.  
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
A panel set of individual commercial bank 
from 2003 to 2008 was used. The data were 
collected from the bank’s balance sheet, in-
come statements, and off-balance sheet ob-
tained from the Banks cope database to con-
struct standard accounting measure of bank-
ing activities. At least, asset size is IDR 300 
billion (USD 32 million) as shown in Table 
1. 
  
Variables 
The variables used are those that are theo-
retically and empirically plausible. This re-
search mainly follows Deelchand and 
Padgett (2009).The variables and definition 
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are presented in the Table 2.  
It is expected that risk has negative rela-
tionship with capital, positive to size and net 
loan to total asset. On the capital side, it is 
expected that the negative relationship with 
risk meaning that less capitalized bank take 
excessive risk. In term of size, the researcher 
expects negative sign as it means the 
economies of scale hold. The researcher also 
expects negative sign meaning that bigger 
bank enjoy market power to select other non 
lending business. 
Table 3 presents the description of the 
variables under investigation. In total, there 
are 229 observations spans from 2003 to 
2008. The Equity to total asset (ETA) has 
mean value 14.5% with standard deviation is 
10%. At minimum, it is 3.4% of asset and 
maximum is 74% of asset. The ratio indi-
cates the strength of capital position. Higher 
ratio means bank has stronger capital than 
the lower one. The Loan to Total Asset 
(LTA) is used to describe the risk taking 
decision of the management. If the ratio is 
high, bank risk taking is also high. 
Risk is to describe the ex post risk. It is 
measured using loan loss provision to total 
loan. Higher ratio means higher ex post 
credit risk. LDR is liquidity ratio and it is 
used to relate with profitability. Higher li-
quidity risk tends to increase profit. Higher 
LDR tends to increase liquidity risk and 
means higher profit. The means of LDR is 
85%. Cost to income ratio (CIR) is effi-
ciency ratio based on accounting data. 
Higher ratio is assumed to have lower effi-
ciency. The means value is 54% and the 
highest is 175%. 
LASSET is used to describe the size. 
Higher the ratio means the bigger the size of 
the bank. The means is 13.81 with the lowest 
is 10.37 and the biggest is 17.34. ROA is a 
profitability measure. Higher ratio means 
bank has higher in profitability. When the 
ratio is negative, bank experiences loses. 
The mean is 2.4% and the highest is 8%. 
Table 1 
Sample Distribution, 2003 – 2008 
 
 
 
Table 2 
The Definition of the Variables  
 
 
Number Year Samples 
1 2003 34 
2 2004 32 
3 2005 40 
4 2006 40 
5 2007 40 
6 2008 43 
  Total 229 
Variables Definitions 
Risk Loan Loss Reserve to total loan (ex post) 
CIR Cost inefficiency is measured by total banking cost divided by total income 
NLTA Net loan to total asset 
SIZE Logarithm of total asset as indicator of bank size operation. 
ROA Profit before tax to total asset as indicator of profitability.  
ETA Equity to total assets (Capital position) 
LTA Loan to total assets ( credit risk taking) 
RISKCAP Loan loss reserve to capital 
LDR Loan to Deposit Ratio (Liquidity risk) 
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RISCAP is ratio of loan loss provision to 
total capital. Higher the ratio, it is indicating 
that the bank has capital problem because it 
is indicating that bank spend most of its 
capital already used to cover loan losses. 
The NLTA is the ratio of net loan to total 
asset. When the ratio is high, means the net 
loan contribute to most of total asset. Bank 
with higher loan size means bank performs 
the function as intermediary institution. On 
average the ratio is 50% maximum 84%. 
When problem loan is too much, the ratio 
can be negative.  
Before we perform estimation using 
2SLS, we test the endogenity of capital. To 
do the testing, we use the Hausman test. It is 
basically testing if the residual of ETA 
(Resid_ETA) is significant in the risk taking 
equation or not. We find that that residual of 
capital equation (Resid_ETA) is significant 
at 1%. The coefficient of resid_ETA is 1.599 
with SE 0.303 with t-value 5.27. It means, 
the use of 2 SLS is necessary for better re-
sult. 
As our data is panel in nature (unbal-
anced panel). To make the model more ap-
propriate, we also test whether fixed effect 
or random effect is more appropriate. When 
the model is carried out using Random Ef-
fect (RE) that applies G2SLS random-effects 
IV regression, we find that rho is very low 
(9.769e-15). It means the correlation with 
error is very low. When the estimation is 
carried out using Fixed Effect (FE) assuming 
that all u_i=0, we find that ANOVA Table 
(F(5.217)) is 6.55. The probability is 1% 
(Prob > F = 0.0000). It is clear that FE is 
more appropriate. That result directs the es-
timation using FE. 
The model must pass the order condition 
test as the failure produce inconsistent coef-
ficient. We can say that it is the sufficient 
condition for system of equations. The ap-
plication of the three stage least square 
method to the estimation of a system of 
equations requires that the model be identi-
fied in a manner that allows the estimation 
of the correct coefficients of the parameters. 
The problem of identification requires that 
two conditions be satisfied. The first condi-
tion, the 'order condition' requires that the 
total number of variables excluded from a 
particular equation but included in the other 
equations must be at least equal to the num-
ber of equations of the system less one. 
Mathematically, this is expressed as follows: 
(K-M) ≥ (G-1) 
[excluded variables] ≥ [total number of 
equations -1] 
G = total number of equations (= total num-
ber of exogenous variables) 
K = total number of variables in the model 
M = number of variables (endogenous and 
exogenous) included in a particular equation. 
There are three possibilities to achieve. 
The first is Identified situation when K-M = 
G-1. The second, is Over identified when K-
M> G-1. The third, is under identified when 
K-M< G-1. Table 4 presents the order condi-
tion of the model. The model is identified. 
From the estimation result using two 
stage regressions, we can explain the fit of 
model. Our parsimonies variables are six 
and the RMSE are all below 5%. For capital 
equation we have RMSE 5% and for credit 
risk taking equation, we have 1%. The R-
Squared is at least 76% meaning that at least 
76% of the variability can be explained by 
the model. For capital equation, the R-
squared is 76% and for credit risk taking 
equation is 99%. The F-Statistics (ANOVA), 
is at least 116. All equation is significant at 
1%. In general, it can be stated that when the 
model is eligible to be used for further 
analysis as it is plausible. 
Table 5 presents the capital equation. 
The model can explain 75% of the capital 
position variability’s. The LTA (risk taking) 
is negative and significant at 1%. It means 
bank with higher risk taking (LTA) tend to 
have lower capital. As risk taking (LTA) is 
instrumental variables, the results confirm 
the endogenity of risk taking to capital. This 
situation confirms the existence of moral 
hazard theory that risk taking (ex ante) tend 
to have lower capital. The risk (ex-post) is 
not influence the capital position. In term of 
liquidity risk, the LDR is positive and sig-
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nificant at 1%. We can infer that banks with 
higher liquidity risk tend to have higher 
capital to cover their liquidity risk position. 
As previously expected, the size is nega-
tive and significant. We can infer here that 
big banks own less capita. Under the theory 
of capital, big banks basically have better 
position in the market in term of position 
such as the government protection. Under 
the theory of too big too fail, big banks own 
less but in reality, due to government im-
plicit support, these banks in practice have 
higher capital position.  
Profitability influences the capital posi-
tion. Profitability is one of important sources 
of bank capital. By retaining the profit, 
banks do not have to issue new capital such 
as initial public offering (IPO). The ROA is 
positive and significant at 1%. It confirm 
that profitability is importance sources of 
capital 
Table 6 presents the credit risk taking 
equation. The risk (ex post credit risk) is 
positive and significant. The result under-
lines the importance of moral hazard theory 
where higher credit risk (ex post) is also 
pushing the management to take more risk 
(ex ante). It can be explained by the moral 
hazard theory that problem banks tend to 
take more risk. Different from the capital 
equation, it is clear that capital is positive 
but significant. We can infer that risk taking 
is not a matter of capital but more on mana-
gerial decision. Under capita regulation the-
ory, we expect that more capital bank will 
have more room to take higher risk. How-
ever, our result provides evidence differ-
ently. It is consistent to the fact when bank 
put more of their capital to support the prob-
lem loan; they also tend to take more risk 
that when the loan loss provision is lower. 
The RISKCAP is positive and significant at 
1% confirm the results. 
The asset has negative relationship with 
credit risk taking. The coefficient is negative 
and significant at 1%. It is understandable as 
the bigger the banks, they have more oppor-
tunity to generate income rather than from 
credit activities. Bigger banks have more 
opportunity to generate income from off-
balance sheet (OBSA) and other income 
from payment service and other fee based 
income.  
The cost efficiency variable (CIR) is 
Table 3 
Descriptive Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ETA (CAPITAL) 229 0.145 0.098 0.034 0.741 
LTA (RISK) 229 0.532 0.160 0.013 0.853 
RISK 229 0.060 0.270 0.000 4.037 
LDR 229 0.853 0.925 0.015 9.813 
CIR 229 0.541 0.199 0.117 1.755 
LASSET 229 13.806 1.584 10.371 17.338 
ROA 229 0.024 0.017 -0.016 0.086 
RISKCAP 229 0.203 0.588 0.000 8.819 
NLTA 229 0.505 0.193 -1.119 0.838 
 
Table 4 
The Order Condition of the Models 
 
No. Equation G-1 K M Position 
1. Risk Taking 2-1 = 1 6 5 Identified 
2. Capital 2-1 = 1 6 5 Identified 
Sources: Calculated from the model 
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negative and significant at 1%. It means in-
efficient bank take less risk taking (LTA). In 
other words, efficient bank takes more risk-
taking than inefficient bank. The results is 
against the moral hazard theory that ineffi-
cient bank take more risk to compensate the 
lower efficiency. The NLTA is positive and 
significant. However, the NLTA seems to 
contain a multicollinearity to dependent 
variables.  
The results confirm the interrelationship 
between credit risk taking and capital posi-
tion. Bank with higher risk taking tend to 
have lower capital. It is not consistent to Al-
tunbas , Carbo, Gardener and Molyneux 
(2003) on European banks. The results, in 
general, provide similar result from the US 
results. Unlike the evidence from the Euro-
pean literature, the result finds any strong 
relationship between capital position and 
bank credit risk-taking. Evidence from full 
sample suggests that inefficient European 
banks do not seem to have an incentive to 
take on more risk. The found stronger em-
pirical evidence is showing the negative re-
lationship between credit risk-taking (ex 
ante) on the level of capital, possibly indi-
cating managerial’ preference for moral haz-
ards.  
In contrast, stronger capital position 
does not inhibit higher credit risk taking. 
The direction of causality that explains the 
moral hazard hypothesis could also flow 
from capital to risk and can be derived from 
the (unintended) consequences of regulatory 
actions. Banks could respond to regulatory 
actions forcing them to increase their capital 
by increasing asset risk. A closely related 
extension to the moral hazard hypothesis 
could arise due to the existence of relevant 
agency problems between owners and stake-
holders. In an unhealthy banking industry, a 
situation when it is more prone to moral 
hazard, entrenched managers will tend to 
take on more risk rather than less risk.  
Our result shows that capital is not a de-
terminant for risk taking but ex ante risk. It 
means capital (ETA) don not influence risk 
taking. Inderst and Muller (2008) support 
our result on the relationship between capital 
and risk taking. Bigger banks take less credit 
risk and efficient banks take higher ex ante 
Table 5 
The Capital Equation Model 
 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
LTA -0.079 0.023 -3.460 0.001 
RISK 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.999 
LDR 0.054 0.004 13.120 0.000 
CIR -0.014 0.026 -0.540 0.589 
LASSET -0.021 0.002 -9.920 0.000 
ROA 2.628 0.271 9.690 0.000 
_cons 0.382 0.043 8.850 0.000 
  
Table 6 
The Risk Taking Equation Model 
 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. T P>t 
RISK 0.205 0.010 19.950 0.000 
ETA 0.012 0.009 1.380 0.168 
LASSET -0.002 0.000 -5.190 0.000 
RISKCAP 0.079 0.004 18.080 0.000 
CIR -0.019 0.003 -5.900 0.000 
NLTA 1.017 0.003 324.660 v 
_cons 0.023 0.007 3.340 0.001 
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credit risk taking. In general, the study is 
considered consistent with Konishi and Ya-
suda (2004). On liquidity, the study consis-
tent to Brewer, et al (2009). 
 
CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUG-
GESTION AND LIMITATIONS 
This study investigated the relationship be-
tween risk and capital using two stage least 
square regression models (2SLS). We found 
that bank risk taking has positive but not 
significant with capital position. It means 
higher capitalized bank does not always take 
higher risk taking. It means capital is not the 
determinant for higher risk taking. Higher ex 
post risk, RISKCAP and net loans (NLTA) 
has positive impact on risk taking negative 
to inefficiency and asset size (LASSET). On 
the capital determinant, we find that higher 
credit risk taking tends to lower capital and 
positively related to liquidity risk. Gig banks 
tend to hold less capital. Higher profitability 
tends to own higher capital. In short, we can 
conclude that risk taking is not determined 
by capital and the capital is negatively de-
termined by risk taking. The relationship 
between capital and risk taking is not two-
way but one way. 
However, this study renders some limi-
tation. The data, for instance, were annual 
data that means a dynamic relationship be-
tween risk, capital and efficiency can not be 
tested. What can be concluded is on average 
relationship between risk, capital and effi-
ciency exist. This study is different from 
study by Shrives and Dahl (1992) that used 
time series that can cover the impact of capi-
tal regulation on risk taking. The drawback 
of this study also arises from the exclusion 
on macroeconomic setting. Yet, it had not 
been performed before, so that in the future 
research should cover regulatory capital.  
However, this study entails some limita-
tion. The data, for instance, were annual data 
meaning that a dynamic relationship be-
tween risk, capital, and efficiency cannot be 
tested. The factors that can be concluded 
deal with the average relationship among 
risk, capital and efficiency exist. This study 
is different from study by Shrives and Dahl 
(1992) that used time series that can cover 
the impact of capital regulation on risk tak-
ing. The lack of this study also arises from 
the exclusion on macroeconomic setting. 
However as this kind of study is not per-
formed before, future research should cover 
regulatory as well as macroeconomic condi-
tion of each countries. More importantly, 
definition of risk and capital should be 
changed to observe stronger theoretical 
foundation and to cope more realistic re-
gional characteristic. For efficiency variable, 
future study should use economic efficiency 
to insulate the data from managerial as well 
as accounting bias. 
 
REFERENCES 
Ahmad, R, Ariff, M and Skully, M.J 2008, 
The Determinants of Bank Capital Ra-
tios in a Developing Economy, Asia-
Pacific Finance Markets 15: 255–272. 
Alfon, I, Argimon, I, Bascunana-Ambros, P 
2004, “What Determines how much 
capital is held by UK Building Socie-
ties?”, FSA Paper, No. 22. 
Altunbas, Y, Carbo, S, Gardener, E.P.M, 
Molyneux, P 2007, Examining the re-
lationships between capital, risk and 
efficiency in European Banking, 
European Financial Management 13, 
49-70. 
Berger, A. N 1995, The relationship between 
capital and earnings in banking, Jour-
nal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 27, 
432-456. 
Berger, A. N. Herring, RJ and Szego, GP , 
The Role of Capital in Financial Insti-
tutions Wharton paper, Working Paper 
95-01. 
Brewer, E. Kaufman, G. & Wall, L 2009, 
“Bank Capital Ratios across Countries: 
Why Do They Vary?” Journal of Fi-
nancial Service Research, 34 No. 2-3: 
177-201. 
Ford, G and Weston, R 2008, Bank Risk and 
Return in the Asia Pacific Region: A 
Cross Country Analysis, SSRN Paper. 
Heid, F, Porath, D, Stolz, S, 2003, Does 
ISSN 2087-3735 Credit Risk-Taking and … (Suhartono) 
126 
Capital Regulation Matter for Bank 
Behavior? Evidence for German Sav-
ings Banks, Working paper, Kiel Insti-
tute for World Economics, Germany. 
Iannotta, G, Giacomo Nocera, Andrea Si-
roni, 2006, Ownership Structure, Risk 
and Performance in the European 
Banking Industry, SSRN Paper. 
Inderst, R and H.M. Mueller, 2008, Bank 
capital structure and credit decisions, 
J. Finan. Intermediation 17, p. 295–
314. 
Jacques, K, Nigro, P, 1997, Risk-based 
Capital, Portfolio Risk and Bank Capi-
tal: A Simultaneous Equations Ap-
proach, Journal of Economics and 
Business 49, 533-548. 
Jensen, M.C., and W.H. Meckling, 1976, 
“Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure” Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics, October, Vol.3, 4, pp. 305-
360. 
Jeitschko, T.D, and Shin, D.J 2007 "Do 
well-capitalized banks take more risk? 
Evidence from the Korean banking 
system", Journal of Banking Regula-
tion 8, 4: 291–315. 
Jokipii, T and Milne, A 2008, The cyclical 
behavior of European bank capital 
buffer, Journal Banking & Finance 32, 
8: 1440-1451. 
Kaziol, K. 2009, “What Make a bank Risky? 
– “Insight From the Optimal Capital 
Structure of Banks”, Journal of Bank-
ing and Finance 33, No. 5:861-873. 
Lindquist, K. G 2004, Bank’s Buffer Capi-
tal: How Important is Risk , Journal of 
International Money and Finance 23, 
No. 3:493-513. 
Konishi, M and Yasuda, Y 2004, Factors 
affecting bank risk taking: evidence 
from Japan , Journal of banking and 
Finance 28, No. : 215-232. 
Modigliani, F. and M.H. Miller,1958, “The 
Costs of Capital, Corporate Finance, 
and the Theory of Investment.” Ameri-
can Economic Review 48: 261-297. 
Repullo, R 2004, Capital requirement, mar-
ket power, and risk-taking in banking. 
Journal of Financial Intermediation 13, 
156-182.  
Shrieves, R.E., Dahl, D 1992, The relation-
ship between risk and capital in com-
mercial banks. Journal of Banking and 
Finance 16, 439-457. 
  
 
